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In the course of deciding that the District of Columbia's handgun
ban violated the Second Amendment, Justice Scalia's majority opinion in
District of Columbia v. Heller offered a remark about technological
change:
Some have made the argument, bordering on the frivolous, that only
those arms in existence in the i8th century are protected by the Second
Amendment. We do not interpret constitutional rights that way. Just as
the First Amendment protects modern forms of communications, e.g.,
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, and the Fourth Amendment
applies to modern forms of search, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, the
Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that
constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the
time of the founding.'
Justice Scalia was charitable to say that this argument "border[s] on the
frivolous." If the "Arms" protected by the Second Amendment included
only those that existed in the eighteenth century, logic would require that
the "Armies" that Congress is authorized to raise can consist only of
infantry marching on foot with antique black powder muskets and of
cavalry mounted on horses. And the "Navy" that Congress is authorized
to maintain would be a fleet of wooden sailing ships. This is all so silly
that one wonders why the Court bothered even to mention it.
Justice Scalia's citation of Reno v. ACLU deepens the mystery, for
the Court in that case sensibly assumed without any comment at all that
the Free Speech Clause applies to communications over the Internet.2
Kyllo v. United States, however, shows that it is not always silly to wonder
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I. 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2791-92 (2oo8) (citations omitted) (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849
(997); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35-36 (2001)).
2. Reno, 521 U.S. at 849.
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whether the Constitution applies to novel devices that were unknown at
the time of the framing. The Court (in an opinion written by Justice
Scalia) concluded that a thermal-imaging device, which the police had
used to detect heat being vented from a house containing what turned
out to be an indoor marijuana garden, had effected a Fourth
Amendment search of the home.' The passage from Kyllo specifically
cited by Justice Scalia in Heller' insisted on articulating a doctrine that
would prevent a central purpose of the Fourth Amendment-protecting
the privacy of the home from government intrusion-from being
undermined by advances in police surveillance technology:
The Government maintains, however, that the thermal imaging
must be upheld because it detected "only heat radiating from the
external surface of the house." The dissent makes this its leading point,
contending that there is a fundamental difference between what it calls
"off-the-wall" observations and "through-the-wall surveillance." But
just as a thermal imager captures only heat emanating from a house, so
also a powerful directional microphone picks up only sound emanating
from a house-and a satellite capable of scanning from many miles
away would pick up only visible light emanating from a house. We
rejected such a mechanical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in
Katz, where the eavesdropping device picked up only sound waves that
reached the exterior of the phone booth. Reversing that approach
would leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology-
including imaging technology that could discern all human activity in
the home. While the technology used in the present case was relatively
crude, the rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated
systems that are already in use or in development.
6
Whether Kyllo was correctly decided on its facts or not,7 the Court was
certainly right to recognize that advances in technology should not allow
the police to accomplish the same invasions of privacy that may not
permissibly be accomplished using eighteenth-century methods, such as
physical invasion. The same recognition should inform the Court's
emerging new Second Amendment jurisprudence. Heller adopts an
approach with a superficial resemblance to Kyllo's. Ironically and
unfortunately, however, it leads to an opposite substantive result. We
propose an approach to the Second Amendment that is more truly
consistent with Kyllo's sound approach to the Fourth Amendment.
Part I of this Article suggests that Heller used a mechanical and
insupportable version of Kyllo's reasoning to justify legislative bans on
weapons that are not currently in common civilian use. At the moment,
3. 533 U.S. at 29.
4. Id. at 34.
5. 128 S. Ct. at 2791 (citing Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35-36).
6. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35-36 (citations omitted) (quoting Brief for the United States at 26, Kyllo,
533 U.S. 27 (No. 99-85o8)).
7. We take no position on this issue.
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this may not seem to be of much practical importance. The firearms most
clearly deprived of Second Amendment protection-short-barreled
shotguns and machine guns-would rarely be a great deal more useful
for purposes of self-defense by civilians than conventional handguns,
rifles, and shotguns. Emerging technologies, however, may lead
legislatures to ban certain kinds of nonlethal weapons that would be
substantially superior to firearms for personal self-defense, and to do so
before those weapons come into common use. Part II sketches the
current status and law of nonlethal weapons. Part III discusses possible
nonlethal technologies of the relatively near future. Part IV tries to
envision the regulatory environment that might develop to govern these
emerging nonlethal technologies. Finally, in Part V, we argue that the
difficulties suggested in the preceding section highlight inadequacies in
Heller and, more generally, with a Second Amendment jurisprudence
that draws a mechanical distinction between technologies that are and
are not currently in public use. We conclude by proposing a Second
Amendment test that is genuinely analogous to the Fourth Amendment
test employed in Kyllo.
I. KYLLO AND HELLER
A. KYLLO: TECHNOLOGIES "IN GENERAL PUBLIC USE"
For a long time after the Bill of Rights was adopted, the Supreme
Court took a narrowly historical approach in applying the Fourth
Amendment. In Olmstead v. United States, for example, the Court held
that the warrantless wiretap of a telephone was not a "search" within the
meaning of the Constitution. In so doing, Chief Justice William Taft's
opinion limited the constitutional protection to the specific types of
government searches known in 1791: "The well known historical purpose
of the Fourth Amendment, directed against general warrants and writs of
assistance, was to prevent the use of governmental force to search a
man's house, his person, his papers and his effects; and to prevent their
seizure against his will."9
In 1967, the Court emphatically rejected this approach in Katz v.
United States.'° Holding that a Fourth Amendment search had taken
place when government agents eavesdropped through an electronic
device attached to the outside of a public telephone booth, the Court
said:
8. 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928).
9. Id. at 463.
10. 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) ("We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman
have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the 'trespass' doctrine there enunciated can no
longer be regarded as controlling.").
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[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not
a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected.... [A]lthough a closely divided Court
supposed in Olmstead that surveillance without any trespass and
without the seizure of any material object fell outside the ambit of the
Constitution, we have since departed from the narrow view on which
that decision rested."
As Justice Scalia noted in Kyllo, the Court has read Katz to
establish the test articulated in Justice John Marshall Harlan's
concurrence: "[A] Fourth Amendment search occurs when the
government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society
recognizes as reasonable."'" Conceding that this test appears on its face
to be circular, and that it may be difficult to refine when areas like
telephone booths and automobiles are involved, Justice Scalia
nonetheless contended that the thermal-imaging case before the Court
could and should be decided on the basis of an historically grounded
originalist analysis:'3
[I]n the case of the search of the interior of homes-the prototypical
and hence most commonly litigated area of protected privacy-there is
a ready criterion, with roots deep in the common law, of the minimal
expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be
reasonable. To withdraw protection of this minimum expectation
would be to permit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed
by the Fourth Amendment. We think that obtaining by sense-
enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the
home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical
"intrusion into a constitutionally protected area," constitutes a
search-at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in
general public use. This assures preservation of that degree of privacy
against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was
adopted."
Justice Stevens's dissent pointed out that "the contours of [the
Court's] new rule are uncertain because its protection apparently
dissipates as soon as the relevant technology is 'in general public use.""..5
Justice Scalia dodged the objection by appealing to precedent, which
ii. Id. at 351-53 (citations omitted).
12. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2oo) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
13. As David Sklansky has shown, Kyllo represents the culmination of a campaign by Justice
Scalia to reestablish Fourth Amendment law on the basis of its original meaning without returning to
Olmstead's narrow historical approach. See generally David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and
Common Law, IOO COLUM. L. REv. 1739 (2000).
14. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (citation omitted) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512
(I961)).
15. Id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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suggests that he had no better response.' 6 But it would not have been
very hard to articulate a rationale for considering whether a given
technology is in general public use. Katz sensibly concluded that "[w]hat
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection,"'7 and a later
case added that "[t]he Fourth Amendment protection of the home has
never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their
eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares."' 8 There is no
apparent reason to prevent the police from making observations that
other members of the public may and do commonly make, for none of us
can have a reasonable expectation of privacy in what we have knowingly
exposed to the public.
Accordingly, if a particular surveillance technology-like thermal-
imaging devices-is not in general public use, people have a reasonable
expectation that their fellow citizens are not using it to observe them.
Similarly, if legislatures make it unlawful for certain technologies-like
electronic eavesdropping devices-to be used by civilians for
surveillance, people will have a reasonable expectation that they are not
being observed by such devices. The important point here is that we can
get a fairly good idea about what people reasonably expect from
objective indicia that operate independently of what courts or other
elements of the government think the government should be permitted
to do. 9 The Fourth Amendment issue can then be resolved without
draining the constitutional provision of effect, which is what would
happen if the government were allowed to create special rules allowing
itself free use of technologies that citizens have good reason to expect are
not being used by other civilians.
Although this approach to the Fourth Amendment may not neatly
solve all of the specific questions that might arise, we do think that it
offers a plausible defense of Justice Scalia's approach in Kyllo against the
objection raised in Justice Stevens's dissent. Fourth Amendment
protection against the government arguably should dissipate once a
surveillance technology comes into general use by the public because of
the commonsensical notion that the government should be permitted to
observe what everybody else can observe. And when technologies
emerge that allow the public to invade our privacy, and we outlaw the
use of those technologies by the public, it is logical to subject the use of
those technologies by the government to Fourth Amendment limitations.
I6. Id. at 39-40 n.6 (majority opinion).
17. 389 U.S. at 351.
i8. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
i9. Where there is a statutory prohibition on the use of certain surveillance technologies by the




B. HELLER: WEAPONS "IN COMMON USE AT THE TIME" VERSUS
"DANGEROUS AND UNUSUAL WEAPONS"
In Heller, Justice Scalia began with a lengthy historical analysis
showing that the Second Amendment protects a private, individual right
to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense against criminal
violence." When he turned to the handgun ban at issue in the case before
the Court, however, Justice Scalia abandoned this historical approach
and simply announced that the ban is unconstitutional because handguns
are commonly used for self-defense today:
The handgun ban amounts to a prohibition of an entire class of "arms"
that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for [the] lawful
purpose [of self-defense]. The prohibition extends, moreover, to the
home, where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most
acute. Under any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to
enumerated constitutional rights, banning from the home "the most
preferred firearm in the nation to 'keep' and use for protection of one's
home and family," would fail constitutional muster.
It is no answer to say, as petitioners do, that it is permissible to ban
the possession of handguns so long as the possession of other firearms
(i.e., long guns) is allowed. It is enough to note, as we have observed,
that the American people have considered the handgun to be the
quintessential self-defense weapon. There are many reasons that a
citizen may prefer a handgun for home defense: It is easier to store in a
location that is readily accessible in an emergency; it cannot easily be
redirected or wrestled away by an attacker; it is easier to use for those
without the upper-body strength to lift and aim a long gun; it can be
pointed at a burglar with one hand while the other hand dials the
police. Whatever the reason, handguns are the most popular weapon
chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home, and a complete
prohibition of their use is invalid."
The Heller opinion also included dicta endorsing legislative bans on
weapons that are "dangerous and unusual," a category that appears to
include all weapons that are not in common use by civilians today." As
examples of weapons that are not in common use today, and therefore
not protected by the Second Amendment, Justice Scalia mentioned
short-barreled shotguns and probably also machine guns: "We therefore
read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect
those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful
purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns. That accords with the
historical understanding of the scope of the right, see Part III, infra."'23
20. 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2788-808 (2oo8).
21. Id. at 2817-18 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Parker v. District of Columbia,
478 F.3d 370,400 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
22. Id. at 2815-16.
23. Id.; see also id. at 2815 (apparently assuming that machine guns are outside the protection of
[Vol. 6o: 1387
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This conclusion is not supported by the cited precedent or by the
historical sources discussed in Part III of the Heller opinion.24 The effects
are also perverse. Under this rule, short-barreled shotguns and machine
guns are per se excluded from protection by the Second Amendment.
Why? Because they are not "typically possessed by law-abiding citizens
for lawful purposes" today.25 But Congress assured that this test could not
be met by adopting oppressive tax and regulatory burdens, beginning
with the National Firearms Act of 1934,26 that guaranteed they would not
be in common use. If Congress had not done this, maybe they would
have become unpopular for other reasons. We may never know for sure,
but what we do know is that Justice Scalia's test empowers Congress to
create its own exceptions to the Second Amendment so long as the
Supreme Court waits awhile before it checks to see whether particular
weapons are in common civilian use.
Suppose, for example, that the federal handgun ban imposed in the
District of Columbia in 19767 had been applied by Congress to the entire
nation that same year. If a case challenging the ban had not reached the
Supreme Court until 2008, it would presumably have been upheld under
the test that Justice Scalia invented in order to justify bans on machine
guns and short-barreled shotguns."
Alternatively, suppose Congress decides now or in the future to
adopt "laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial
sale" 9 of handguns, perhaps along the lines of the conditions and
qualifications that have been used to suppress the market for short-
barreled shotguns and machine guns. Given the large number of
handguns already owned by civilians, it might take some time for
handguns to become as rare as machine guns or short-barreled shotguns.
But the government could presumably accelerate that process by
purchasing handguns from their current owners, especially if onerous
regulatory burdens were placed on those who were reluctant to sell. The
holding in Heller would thereby be overturned, for a handgun ban would
no longer be an unconstitutional law that "amounts to a prohibition of an
entire class of 'arms' that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society
for [the] lawful purpose [of self-defense]. 3 °
the Second Amendment).
24. For a detailed analysis, see Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist
Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REv. 1343 (2009).
25. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816.
26. National Firearms Act, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (I934) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.
§§ 58O-5872 (2oo6)).
27. See D.C. CODE §§ 7-2501.01, 7-2502 (2OO1).
28. That result would also have been supported by Justice Scalia's use of the term "longstanding"
to characterize felon-in-possession laws that did not exist until 1968. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816-17.




Thus, the approach taken in Heller really is vulnerable to the kind of
objection that Justice Stevens made in Kyllo." Unlike Kyllo's sensible
effort to find an objective way to determine whether a constitutional
claimant had a reasonable expectation of privacy, Heller invites the
government itself to diminish the scope of a constitutional right by
preventing certain arms from being in common use by civilians. Perhaps
the Heller dicta will be applied only to weapons like short-barreled
shotguns and machine guns, which are arguably inferior (or at least only
marginally superior) to commonly-used firearms for purposes of self-
defense. If so, the constitutional right will not be greatly affected. But the
Heller opinion does not by its terms require, or even invite, such a
narrow interpretation. The emergence of new technologies involving
nonlethal weapons suggests that there is a very real possibility that Heller
may soon be used to produce results that undermine the purpose of the
Second Amendment.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF NONLETHAL WEAPONS:
CURRENT STATUS AND LAW
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NONLETHAL WEAPONS
Over the past fifty years, the impetus for the development of
nonlethal weapons has come from three sources: the police, the military,
and the general public.
The military has long had an interest in weapons that operate
through some mechanism other than blunt trauma or penetrating
wounds.32 In general, such weapons were seen as supplements to
traditional weapons, or in military lingo, as "force multipliers."33 After
poison gas was used to sometimes deadly effect in World War I, several
nations signed international protocols and treaties to ban the use of
chemical weapons.34 To some extent, these legal bans simply rechanneled
the military's interest into nonchemical alternative weapons. In waging
limited wars after the mid-twentieth century, the military continued to
seek out weapons technologies that were more graduated and
discriminating than traditional weapons.3 The political goals of such
wars-to win the hearts and minds of indigenous populations-meant
rules of engagement that restricted the use of lethal force in order to
31. See supra text accompanying note 15.
32. Neil Davison, The Early History of "Non-Lethal" Weapons 4-5 (Dec. 2006) (unpublished
manuscript), available at httpJ/www.brad.ac.uk/acad/nlw/research-reports/docs/BNLWRP OPi-Deco6.pdf.
33. Id. at 25.
34. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases,
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65.
35. INDEP. TASK FORCE SPONSORED BY THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NONLETHAL WEAPONS
AND CAPABILmES II (2004) [hereinafter INDEP. TASK FORCE], available at http://www.fas.org/
rlg/o4oooo-nonlethal.pdf.
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limit civilian casualties. Military operations in the Middle East over the
past two decades have further catalyzed the military's interest in
nonlethal weapons.
Two stories are illustrative. On the one hand, in March 1995, U.S.
Marines armed with nonlethal weapons (ranging from low-tech pepper
spray to high-tech lasers) extricated 2500 UN peacekeepers from densely
populated Mogadishu, Somalia. 6 On the other hand, the sailors aboard
the U.S.S. Cole were foreclosed from using lethal weapons against the
small vessel that approached the destroyer.37 The ensuing damage and
loss of life aboard the Cole might have been averted had the sailors
carried, and been authorized to use, nonlethal weapons. These two
experiences intensified the military's interest in weapons that provide a
continuum of force that can be adapted appropriately to a variety of
missions. Created in 1996, the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate of
the Department of Defense started with a tiny budget, but it was
increased to $45 million annually in 2004; further increases are almost
certain.3
Until quite recently, domestic policing was a low-tech enterprise. As
late as 1971, a report found that: "There have been few advances in
police weaponry in recent times.... [O]fficers on the beat for the most
part rely on the same weapons they did a century ago-their personal
prowess, the nightstick, and the handgun."39 Civil unrest in the i96os
sparked some interest in newer technologies,"0 but advanced weaponry
was scarcely integrated into the day-to-day work of policing. In 1974,
police forces were offered a chance to purchase what were labeled by
their inventor as "Tasers. ' '4' These contraptions shoot wire-bound darts
36. See id. at l.
37. See, e.g., DAVID KoPLOW, NON-LETHAL WEAPONS 28 n.30 (2oo6).
38. The Joint NLW Directorate is overseen by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, who is
charged with "providing program recommendations for stimulating and coordinating joint nonlethal
weapons requirements." DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE No. 3000.3, POLICY FOR NON-LETHAL WEAPONS
(1996). Several defense contractors are already profiting from this Directorate's largesse. See Press
Release, American Systems, American Systems Awarded $34.8 Million Department of Defense
Blanket Purchase Agreement (May 19, 2007), available at http://www.2asc.com/NewsAndEvents/
NLWContractWin.htm (describing a $35 million blanket purchase agreement with one contractor);
Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program Website, Solicitation Information, https://www.jnlwp.comladmin/
solicitations.asp (last visited June 1o, 2009) (describing various active solicitations). The Council of
Foreign Relations recommended that the annual budget be increased to $300 million. INDEP. TASK
FORCE, supra note 36, at 2.
39. Davison, supra note 32, at 5 (quoting DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NON-LETHAL WEAPONS FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT: RESEARCH NEEDS AND PRIORITIES (1971)).
40. The National Advisory Committee on Civil Disorder's Report in the aftermath of the 1967
riots in Newark and Detroit recommended "that in suppressing disorder, the police, whenever
possible, follow the example of the U.S. Army in requiring the use of chemical agents before the use of
deadly weapons." Id. at 9 (quoting NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968)).
41. "Taser" is an acronym of "Tom A. Swift Electrical Rifle," a reference to the Tom Swift
June 2009]
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that ensnare a victim and discharge a high-voltage electrical shock; the
impulse interferes with the brain's ability to control the body's muscular
system, causing most victims to crumple helplessly to the ground.42 In
most cases Tasers cause no injuries and only fleeting, albeit intense, pain;
but in some cases-estimates of how many vary widely-serious injuries
and even death can result.43 Police forces, however, at first had no
interest in newfangled Tasers.4 Similarly, pepper spray was developed as
a hand-held weapon in the I960s, but it was not until the I98os that a
government agency began to use it (and even then it was used only by
the Postal Service as a dog repellent).45
One commentator notes that it was soon after the Supreme Court's
1985 decision in Tennessee v. Garner,46 restricting the use of lethal force
to stop a fleeing felon, that police forces across America awakened to the
usefulness of advanced nonlethal weapons.47 Old-fashioned nonlethal
weapons-such as batons, rubber bullets, dogs, and tear gas-were all
defective for obvious reasons,:8 but Tasers and pepper spray promised to
liberate the police from the unsatisfactory choice of "bullhorns or
bullets."'49 Over the last decade, thousands of police forces across the
United States have added these weapons to their ordinary arsenal. °
Affording various perceived advantages to handguns and other nonlethal
alternatives, Tasers are now so commonplace that the failure of a police
officer to be equipped with one, and his consequent decision to use a
firearm, led to a recent civil lawsuit.' Of course, police officers are also
fantasy stories that John Cover, the weapon's inventor, read during his childhood. Id. at 13.
42. David A. Koplow, Tangled Up in Khaki and Blue: Lethal and Non-Lethal Weapons in Recent
Confrontations, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 703, 77 (2005); Daniel Engber, How Do Tasers Work?, SLATE,
Nov. 2 1, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2154253.
43. Supra note 42.
44. Davison speculates that police were "unimpressed" by the early version of the weapon, and
were also mindful of "unfavourable public opinion about electrical weapons at the time." See Davison,
supra note 32, at 13.
45. "Pepper spray," in its current form, uses a chemical, oleoresin capsicum (OC), that is derived
from cayenne pepper. Koplow, supra note 42, at 718. It has supplanted tear gas and Mace as the
preferred active agent in nonlethal chemical sprays. See id. at 719.
46. 471 U.S. i, 3 (1985) ("We conclude that [deadly] force may not be used unless necessary to
prevent the escape [of an apparently unarmed felon] and the officer has probable cause to believe that
the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.").
47. Davison, supra note 32, at 22-23.
48. To mention a few defects: batons are effective only at close range, rubber bullets can be
deadly, an enraged dog is hard to control, and tear gas and other chemicals are often ineffective.
Koplow, supra note 42, at 712.
49. Id. at 703.
5o. Taser FAQs, CBC NEws, Mar. 31, 2009, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/storyl2o09/o3/18/f-taser-
faq.html (citing Taser International statistics claiming that 13,400 police forces in forty-four countries
now use the device).
51. In Martinez v. County of Los Angeles, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 772, 779 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), the
plaintiff in a civil rights suit argued that police should have been equipped with nonlethal weapons,
such as Tasers and Mace.
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regularly sued for using Tasers unnecessarily, and stories of misuse
continue to stir up controversy. 2 Despite sometimes vigorous objections,
police forces across the United States and the world have embraced
Tasers.53 Sundry studies purport to demonstrate that equipping police
with these devices has prevented many deaths and injuries.54
Civilian interest in pepper spray and Tasers has soared in recent
years, and there are now dozens of companies peddling these products
on the Internet." Although companies have creatively marketed their
products and pitched to groups that have shown little interest in
firearms, 6 few people are getting rich selling these weapons to the public.
Taser International, Inc., the largest domestic Taser manufacturer, has a
market capitalization of less than $300 million, and most of its customers
are domestic police forces.57
B. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PEPPER SPRAY AND TASERS
Compared with firearms, how useful are pepper spray and Tasers as
weapons of self-defense?:8 We suggest four metrics: (i) how easily the
weapon can be used, especially by those not trained in self-defense; (2)
how effectively the weapon deters would-be attackers; (3) how
effectively, if used, the weapon stops an attacker; and (4) how effectively
the weapon minimizes harm to the target.
52. See, e.g., Buckley v. Haddock, 292 F. App'x 791 (iIth Cir. 2008); M.J. Stephey, Are Tasers
Being Overused?, TIME.COM, Oct. 31,2007, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/o,8816,i678641ioo.html.
53. Police to be armed with stun guns, BBC NEWS, Nov. 24, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/i/hi/uk/
7745137.stm (reporting that 30,000 police officers across the United Kingdom will be equipped with
Tasers). The Royal Canadian Mounted Police recently discontinued their use of Tasers, at least
temporarily, when a study found that Tasers occasionally deliver shocks of more voltage than
advertised. Ronald Hensen & Robert Anglen, Canadian Police pull old Tasers off Streets, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Dec. 12, 2o08, available at http://www.azcentral.comlnews/articles/2008/12/12/
20081212taser1212.html.
54. See, e.g., Memorandum from Douglas E. Klint, Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Taser Int'l
(June 25, 2007), available at http//www.taser.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Controlled%2oDocuments/
LegaITASER%2oDevice%2oLiability%2oand%2oLitigation%2oRisk.pdf (collecting studies from several
police forces claiming to find substantial reductions in injuries during use-of-force encounters when
police carry Tasers).
55. See, e.g., BestStunGun.com, Stun Guns, Air TASER, Pepper Spray at Low Prices, http://
www.beststungun.com (last visited June 10, 2009).
56. At least one entrepreneur has conducted "Taser parties" for suburban women to interest
them in the product. See Taser "Parties" Pitching Them To Women, CBS NEWS, June 25, 2oo8,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2oo8/o6/25/earlyshow/main4207156.shtml?source=RSSattr=SciTech-4
207156. Tasers can now be purchased in metallic pink. See RV Protection Products, Taser C2,
http://www.rvprotectionproducts.com/index.php?p=product&id=1134&parent=i59 (last visited June
10,2009).
57. See Yahoo! Finance, TASER International, Inc., http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=tasr (reporting
a market capitalization of $276 million on June 13, 2009).
58. We focus on these two nonlethal weapons because they are the most commonly used by the
police and general public.
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Judged by ease of use59 and minimization of harm,6° pepper spray
and Tasers are generally superior to traditional lethal weapons, such as
handguns and shotguns. However, they are grossly inferior in deterrent
value. To be sure, nonlethal weapons create a risk of injury, as well as of
arrest and imprisonment, which provides some deterrent value. But their
threat value pales in comparison with the threatened use of a firearm. As
Eugene Volokh has observed, the threat "I have a gun!" will always be
more hair-raising than "I have a Taser!" or "I have pepper spray!",
6'
With respect to stopping power, pepper spray and Tasers are also
inferior to handguns. Pepper spray can be projected from pressurized
canisters as far as twenty feet, but it must hit exposed skin, or at least thin
clothing, to disable the victim, and there is the risk that wind will blow
the spray back on the person firing it. More importantly, pepper spray's
effectiveness against those enflamed by rage or drugs has been• 62
questioned. Turning to Tasers, their manufacturers make grandiose
claims about the weapon's stopping power, even claiming it compares
favorably to that of handguns.6 , Although one can overstate the
effectiveness of ordinary handguns,64 claims that Tasers are superior in
this regard to handguns are hard to credit. As with pepper spray, a
Taser's usefulness against those energized to commit violence has been
undercut by anecdotal evidence.6 As a weapon of self-defense, one of
59. Pepper spray is discharged from a pressurized canister that requires very little skill or effort.
Karen M. Blum & John J. Ryan, Recent Developments in the Use of Excessive Force by Law
Enforcement, 24 ToURo L. REV. 569, 590 (2oo8). Tasers, when "shot," must be aimed, but are reported
to have no recoil. Advanced Taser M181Mi8L Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.taserstore.org/taser-faq.html (last visited June io, 2009) (follow "ii. Is using a TASER
similar to shooting a gun?" hyperlink).
60. This is not to say, of course, that pepper spray and Tasers cause no harm, or even occasional
fatalities, but simply that they cause less harm and fewer fatalities than firearms. Of course, it could be
argued that they are overused precisely because they are regarded as nonlethal and therefore not
dangerous. ACLU chapters across the country have written studies alleging police overuse of pepper
spray and Tasers. See, e.g., ACLU OF NEB., TASER USE BY NEBRASKA LAW ENFORCEMENT: THE CASE
FOR POLICY REFORM (2005), available at http://aclunebraska.org/ACLU%2oTaser%2ostudy.pdf; ACLU
OF S. CAL., PEPPER SPRAY: A MAGIC BULLET UNDER SCRUTINY (1993).
61. Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An
Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443 (2009).
62. See Koplow, supra note 42, at 719.
63. Brandi Wheeler, StreetDirectory.com, Protect yourself With the Advanced Taser MI,
http://www.streetdirectory.com/trave-guide/6o9o4/home-security/protect-Yourself-with-theadvance
d_taser_m18l.html (last visited June 10, 2009) (claiming police studies show that a Taser has more
incapacitating power than a 9mm handgun).
64. See EVAN P. MARSHALL & EDWIN J. SANOW, HANDGUN STOPPING POWER: THE DEFINITIVE
STUDY 3 (1992) ("With the exception of a wound to the brain stem, handgun bullets cannot be
depended upon to take effect that fast. Sometimes the bullet will produce no visible effect at all. It
may take 30 to 9o seconds or longer for the person to fall.").
65. To take one notorious example, when Rodney King was Tasered, "rather than causing [him]
to fall down,... [he] rose up to his feet and groaned, 'Ahh, ahh,' and started advancing toward [the
police officer]." Ty Apler, Stories Told and Untold: Lawyering Theory Analyses of the First Rodney
King Assault Trial, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 37 (2005); see also Eric M. Weiss, Va. Man Dies After Battles
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the Taser's drawbacks is that it typically fires only once, and therefore
offers little help if there is a second attacker or if the first shot misses its
target. 6 In addition, heavy clothes may dampen its impact,67 and a victim
may even be able to remove the darts from his body, 68 not something one
can do with a bullet in the torso, let alone the head.
C. THE LAW OF NONLETHAL WEAPONS
Anomalies festoon the law of nonlethal weapons. At times not
regulated at all, at times completely banned, nonlethal weapons are
subject to a patchwork of local, state, federal, and even international
regulation.
Pepper spray is generally unregulated by the federal government.
Many states prohibit felons and minors from owning pepper spray,69 and
some states regulate the size of the canisters and the concentrations of
the liquid.7" But for adult Americans not convicted of a felony, pepper
spray is widely available and legal." International law-in particular, the
Chemical Weapons Convention72 - is arguably more restrictive of the use
of pepper spray and tear gas. Although a fourteen-year-old American
With Officers, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2004, at B3 (reporting that a man who continued to resist police
officers despite being Tasered and pepper sprayed was finally stopped, and was killed, when shot by
handgun).
66. Tom Harris, How Stun Guns Work, http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/gadgets/other-gadgets/
stun-gun5.htm (last visited June io, 2009) ("The disadvantage is that you only get one shot-you have
to wind up and re-pack the electrode wires, as well as load a new gas cartridge, each time you fire.
Most Taser models also have ordinary stun-gun electrodes, in case the Taser electrodes miss the
target.").
67. See, e.g., Peter Akman, Suspect Fleeing Police Smashes Into Car, Withstands Taser Jolt, CBC
NEWS, Mar. 31, 2009, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/calgary/story/2oo9/o3/3i/cgy-deerfoot-memorial-crash-
chase.html ("Stewart said an officer deployed a Taser once, but it was ineffective because the shock
didn't penetrate through the suspect's heavy clothing."). Another possible drawback is the
development of counter-technologies, such as Taser-Proof clothes. See Taser-proof Clothing Creates
New Hazard, NEW SCIENsTSr, Nov. 2007, at 29, available at http://www.newscientist.con/article/
mgi96262964oo-taserproof-clothing-creates-new-hazard.html.
68. See, e.g., People v. Brown, No. Eo42334, 2oo8 WL 4597402, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 16,2o08)
("Corporal Wills fired darts from a taser towards defendant's chest, but they appeared to have no
effect. Corporal Wills again fired darts from a taser, which struck defendant's chest. Defendant
doubled over and screamed, but then pulled the darts from his chest and ran from the room.").
69. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3 9-6i. (West 2005); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.25 (McKinney 2oo8).
70. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 12403.7 (West 2000); MICH. COmP. LAWS SERV. § 750.22 4 d
(LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 20o8).
71. Eugene Volokh's forthcoming article on the topic has an exhaustive appendix that compiles
all state and local laws, and regulations, banning or restricting the use of Tasers. Eugene Volokh,
Nonlethal Self-Defense, Stun Guns, and the Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, Defend Life, and Practice
Religion, 62 STAN. L. REV. app. (forthcoming 2009-20i0), available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/
volokh/stungun.pdf. He identifies only seven states and a dozen localities that have outright bans. Id.
His appendix also indicates that a scattering of other jurisdictions regulate ownership and use of
Tasers by minors and felons. Id.
72. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. No.
103-2I, 1974 U.N.T.S. 317.
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strolling through downtown Spokane is free, provided he has parental
consent, to carry pepper spray,73 some have argued that his twenty-year-
old brother in Baghdad can do so only in narrowly defined
circumstances.74
Tasers present an even more complicated story. When Tasers were
first developed, the Consumer Product Safety Commission claimed
jurisdiction in 1975,75 followed by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms (ATF) in I976;76 these agencies meddled with sales to the
public, and even banned them for a time.77 After ATF abandoned the
field,7s Tasers became a matter for state and local regulation. In a
substantial minority of states, felons79 and minors" are prohibited by state
law from owning Tasers, and even law-abiding adults are confronted with
outright bans in seven states and the District of Columbia." In addition,
73. The State of Washington permits minors fourteen and older to carry pepper spray, with
parental consent. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.91.16o (2008).
74. See, e.g., Geoffrey Lean & Severin Carroll, U.S. Prepares to Use Toxic Gases in Iraq,
INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Mar. 2, 2003, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-
prepares-to-use-toxic-gases-in-iraq-599193.html ("The U.S. is preparing to use the toxic riot-control
agents CS gas and pepper spray in Iraq in contravention of the Chemical Weapons Convention.") This
supposed anomaly is lamented in the Report of the Council on Foreign Relations, see INDEP. TASK
FORCE, supra note 40, at 51-52, but it should be noted that, notwithstanding the protests and perhaps
dubiously restrictive interpretations of the Chemical Weapons Convention proffered by some, U.S.
military personnel in Iraq now regularly carry pepper spray and Tasers. See Roxana Tiron,
Unconventional Weapons Can Help U.S. Troops Fight Insurgents in Iraq, NAT'L DEF., Sept. 2004, at
38-39, available at http://www.ref.army.mil/pdfs/Unconventionalweapons.pdf.
75. Memorandum from Jeanette Michaels, OGC, to Tom McKay, OCR, U.S. Consumer Prod.
Safety Comm'n (Nov. 7, 1975), available at http://www.cpsc.gov/LIBRARY/FOIA/advisory/226.pdf.
76. Memorandum from Jeanette Michaels, OGC, to the U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n,
(Mar. 22, 1976), available at http://www.cpsc.gov/LIBRARY/FOIA/advisory/236.pdf.
77. Davison, supra note 32, at 13-14.
78. See Shaun H. Kedir, Stunning Trends in Shocking Crimes: A Comprehensive Analysis of Taser
Weapons, 20 J.L. & HEALTH 357, 367 n.83 (2o07) ("The Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,
and Explosions classifies a device as a firearm when it 'expel[s] a projectile by the action of an
explosive.' Tasers, however, use compressed nitrogen gas as propellant." (quoting is U.S.C. §
921(a)(3)(A) (2006))).
79. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § I2650 (West 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-217 (2009); NEv.
REV. STAT. § 202-357 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.21 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-3o8.2 (2004
& Supp. 2008).
so. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-133 (2005) (prohibiting ownership by or sale to a person
under eighteen); CAL. PENAL CODE § 12650 (prohibiting ownership by or sale to a person under
sixteen); MINN. STAT. § 624.731 (2008) (prohibiting ownership by or sale to a person under eighteen).
8i. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 7-2501 (2OOI); HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-16 (1993 & Supp. 2007) ("It shall
be unlawful for any person, including a licensed manufacturer, licensed importer, or licensed dealer, to
possess, offer for sale, hold for sale, sell, give, lend, or deliver any electric gun."); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
140, § 13 1J (2007) ("No person shall possess a portable device or weapon from which an electric
current, impulse, wave or beam may be directed, which current, impulse, wave or beam is designed to
incapacitate temporarily, injure or kill... No person shall sell or offer for sale such device or
weapon...."); Mci. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 75o.224a(I) (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2o08) ("[A] person
shall not sell, offer for sale, or possess in this state a portable device or weapon from which an electric
current, impulse, wave, or beam may be directed, which current, impulse, wave, or beam is designed to
incapacitate temporarily, injure, or kill."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-1(h) (West 2oo5) ("Any person
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some states that permit civilians to carry firearms in a concealed manner
have outright bans on doing so with Tasers.2 One wonders why people
deemed responsible enough to possess or carry a handgun would not be
trusted with Tasers.
III. THE FUTURE OF NONLETHAL WEAPONS:
FROM SUPER-TASERS TO PHASERS
War, Thucydides observed, is a stern teacher8s Violent struggle has
spurred technological progress over the centuries. Although it is true that
gunpowder, over a millennium old, is still a staple ingredient in lethal
weaponry today, the push for more powerful and versatile weapons has
already led mankind in terrifying directions, and there is no indication
that we have reached anything close to a terminal point in weapons
technology. Rail guns, lasers, and pulsed energy have already emerged in
some workable, or close to workable, form. 4 And there is every reason
to believe that the handguns of today, which are not much more
advanced than those of a century ago, are poised for substantial
improvements. Lighter and more reliably deadly weapons will continue
to even the playing field between the physically strong and weak, which
who knowingly has in his possession any stun gun is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree."); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 265.0i (McKinney 2008) (making it a felony to "[possess] any firearm, electronic dart
gun, electronic stun gun."); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-47-42 (2002) ("No person shall carry or possess or
attempt to use against another any instrument or weapon of the kind commonly known as a... stun-
gun ... "); WIs. STAT. § 941.295(l) (2007) ("Whoever sells, transports, manufactures, possesses or goes
armed with any electric weapon is guilty of a Class H felony."); see also Paul H. Robinson, A Right to
Bear Firearms But Not to Use Them? Defensive Force Rules and the Increasing Effectiveness of Non-
Lethal Weapons, 89 B.U. L. REV. 251, 252 n.9 (2009) (collecting most of these statutes). In addition,
within some states that permit the ownership of Tasers, there are cities and counties that prohibit
them. See, e.g., BALT., MO., CITY CODE art. I9, § 59-28(a)(I) (2009) ("It shall be unlawful for any
person, firm, or corporation to sell, give away, lend, rent or transfer to any individual, firm, or
corporation a stun gun or other electronic device by whatever name or description which discharges a
non-projectile electric current within the limits of the City of Baltimore."); HOWARD COUNTY, MD.,
§ 8.404(a) (2oo8) ("It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to sell, give away, lend, rent
or transfer to any individual, firm or corporation an electronic weapon within the limits of Howard
County. It further shall be unlawful for any person to possess, fire, discharge or activate any electronic
weapon within the limits of Howard County."); PHILA., PA., CITY ORDINANCE § io-825(2) (2oo7) ("No
person shall own, use, possess, sell or otherwise transfer any 'stun gun."'). New York State prohibits
Tasers and New York City applies a second level of illegality. N.Y., N.Y., CHARTER & ADMINISTRATrIVE
CODE § 10-1 3 5 (b) (1996) ("It shall be unlawful for any person to sell or offer for sale or to have in his
or her possession within the jurisdiction of the city any electronic stun gun.").
82. CONN. GEN STAT. 53-206 (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269(a) (2005).
83. THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 242 (Rex Warner trans., Penguin Books
1985).
84. David Allan Adam, Naval Rail Guns are Revolutionary, PROCEEDINGS MAo., Feb. 2003,
available at http://edusworld.org/ew/ficheros/2oo4/railguns.pdf; Erik Sofge, World's Most Powerful Rail




may require an update to the old adage that God made men, and Samuel
Colt made them equal.85
Nonlethal weapons will also improve dramatically. There are already
several nascent nonlethal technologies developed by the military that
may have civilian uses. One example is the Active Denial System (ADS).
This weapon focuses a beam of electromagnetic radiation that heats the
victim's outermost skin, causing acute pain, but without burning or
causing permanent damage."' The technology could easily be adapted
into a lethal variant, 7 providing the user, at least in theory, with the
choice of a range of force in dealing with an attacker. The original ADS
technology was adapted by the Air Force Research Laboratory, but
Raytheon Company last year started selling a more mobile version,
called Silent Guardian, to police forces in the United States and United
Kingdom. 8 The next step in this evolution would be smaller and more
mobile versions that could be used by civilians for self-defense.
If Tasers have been the subject of much criticism by civil liberties
organizations and the "human rights community," ADS-type weapons
are possibly even more gruesome. The infliction of pain is the intended,
not incidental, result of their operation: they incapacitate by causing
acute pain. Grotesque uses are not hard to imagine,' ° and other
technologies that are superior by our fourth metric (minimization of
harm) will likely be preferred. In addition, it may be easy to defend
against ADS attacks: aluminum foil might be sufficient.
Another nonlethal technology that has recently attracted interest is
the Long Range Acoustical Device (LRAD), which directs beams of
painfully loud sounds, in theory forcing those in its acoustical path to
cover their ears and beat a hasty retreat.' Although an LRAD can cause
permanent hearing damage, it does not risk mortal injury,92 and has
already been used by the U.S. military in Iraq and by a few police forces
in riot control situations.' Were it practicable, an acoustical device would
85. An old adage the origins of which are obscure. Another version was, "Abe Lincoln may have
freed all men, but Samuel Colt made them equal."
86. See JURGEN ALTMANN, MILLIMETRE WAVES, LASERS, AcouSTIcs FOR NON-LETHAL WEAPONS?
PHYSICS ANALYSES AND INFERENCES 14-28 (2008), available at http://www.bundesstiftung-
friedensforschung.de/pdf-docs/berichtaltmann2.pdf.
87. Id. at 28 ("[T]he ADS could be called non-lethal beyond any doubt only if technical limiters
were built in which guarantee that a target subject would not be heated to more than 55-6o [degrees
Celsius] skin temperature under any circumstance.").
88. See Raytheon Silent Guardian Product Brief (2oo6), available at http://www.raytheon.com/
capabilities/products/stellent/groups/public/documents/content/cmso4-o17939.pdf.
89. See supra note 6o.
9o. Its utility as an instrument of torture has not escaped notice. See Altmann, supra note 86, at
28.
91. Id. at 44.
92. See, e.g., id. at 46.
93. Associated Press, Troops in Iraq Get High Tech Noisemaker, Mar. 3, 2004, available at
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be a significant advance over Tasers, ADS-type weapons, and traditional
firearms precisely because it achieves its results without risk of grave
harm (other than burst eardrums). Yet there are doubts about how
effective acoustical devices can be in deterring and stopping attackers.
One can, for example, easily imagine the protestors of the future wearing
not only bandanas as protection against tear gas, but earmuffs as well.
The LRAD's utility was recently called into further question as a result
of its failure to deter pirates in the Gulf of Aden.94
Yet another nonlethal technology that has already been used is the
Mobility Denial System (MDS), which is military-speak for a
hydrocarbon-based slippery gel.95  An MDS precursor, dubbed
"superfoam," was used by U.S. soldiers in Somalia in 1995 with some
success,96 and the Department of Energy is interested in such technology
to protect facilities with weapons-grade uranium and nuclear power
plants.97 At least in its present form, MDS is problematic as a weapon of
self-defense. If used only against an attacker's lower extremities, his
hands will still be free (e.g., to fire a pistol); but if directed against an
attacker's entire body, it could be ingested through the mouth or nose,
and therefore become gruesomely lethal.
In short, none of these weapons appears to be equal to traditional
firearms for self-defense. Great improvements are likely, however, either
through incremental improvements to Tasers, or through some
breakthrough technology. One can imagine the development of what we
will call Super-Tasers, which solve many of the problems with that
weapon in its current form. Super-Tasers will be able to shoot multiple
projectiles, have a greater firing range, and more reliably discharge a
voltage calibrated to incapacitate without proving fatal. At some point,
these Super-Tasers might become competitors to handguns as weapons
of self-defense, as judged by the four metrics sketched above. They might
prove at least as easy to use and of equivalent or greater stopping power,
while being superior in terms of minimization of harm.
Super-Tasers will, however, forever have less deterrent effect than
handguns, at least as long as the voltage discharged is designed to
incapacitate without being deadly. Again, the problem is that the threat
"I have a Super-Taser!" is simply not as harrowing as "I have a gun!"
http://www.military.com/NewsContenT/o,13319,FL-noise-o3o3o4,oo.html?ESRC=eb.nl.
94. David Osler, Sonic Solution May Not Be A Sound Investment, LLOYD'S LIST, Dec. 2, 2008,
http://www.Iloydslist.com/11/news/sonic-solution-may-not-be-a-sound-investment/I228 I32740372.htm.
95. David Hambling, The Army's Banana Peel Weaponry, WIRED, July 31, 2008, available at
http://www.wired.com/dangerrooml2oo8/o7/slippery-busine/.
96. Noah Shachtman, Army Reloads on Sticky Foam Weaponry, WIRED, Feb. 26, 2009, available at
http://www.wired.com/dangerrooml2009/o2/foam-based-vehil.




This suggests, however, a possible next generation of nonlethal
weaponry. Without in any way suggesting the physics of such a device,
which we will call Phasers, they will offer the user the rheostatic option
to choose a spectrum of force, anywhere from trivial to lethal-that is,
they could be set, like the weapons of Star Trek, to "stun" or "kill." The
threat "I have a Phaser!" would then approach the threat "I have a gun!"
in deterrent effect, as the potential target would not know what level of
force is contemplated. Phasers will be easy to use, have instant stopping
power, and accomplish this result without any risk of permanent harm, at
least when set in "stun" mode. One might discount all this as fanciful, but
given the exponential rate of technological advancement in many other
fields, it would be rash to think it impossible. Having imagined the
technology, we now consider the legal regimes that might arise to govern
it.
IV. REGULATING NONLETHAL WEAPONS
Will the regulatory environment be nurturing or noxious for future
nonlethal weapons? The answer may depend on how the weapons come
into being. If Super-Tasers emerge through incremental improvements to
existing products, regulators at the state and federal level may face
politically difficult choices. As discussed earlier, Tasers are widely legal
today.8 If Tasers become incrementally better, and eventually become
Super, this development will stimulate both the demand for the product
and the demand for the product's regulation. On the one hand, people
will come to regard Super-Tasers as legitimate substitutes for handguns
as weapons of self-defense. On the other hand, if Super-Tasers are more
widely used, there will inevitably be more instances of abuse, real and
alleged.
We can only speculate on how these competing interests will play
out in the legislative process. Some organizations, perhaps
philosophically opposed to an armed citizenry, will find it easy to point to
incidents of Super-Taser abuse in lobbying legislators to regulate them.
The companies selling these products would of course lobby in the
opposite direction. Gun-rights organizations might expend resources
opposing bans on Super-Tasers, fearing a slippery slope toward more
restrictive firearms regulation, and ultimately toward a complete ban on
useful weapons of self-defense. On the other hand, these groups might
fear that the proliferation of Super-Tasers will undermine the case for
gun rights. If one can defend oneself effectively with a nonlethal Super-
Taser, what need is there to own a lethal gun?
Reducing all of these conflicting considerations to a simple
prediction is impossible. Although we can imagine some states that now
98. See supra note 71.
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permit Tasers deciding to ban Super-Tasers, we think it unlikely that the
federal government, after abstaining from regulating Tasers four decades
ago, 99 is likely to terminate sales of Super-Tasers in the future. Federal
government involvement in Phaser sales would be far more likely. Here
we would likely be dealing with a breakthrough technology that had
arisen, in all likelihood, as a military weapon. One possible trajectory for
Phaser regulation is reflected in the story of Global Positional System
(GPS) technology. GPS was developed by the U.S. Department of
Defense in the mid-twentieth century, and access was originally denied
to non-U.S. military personnel."'° After Korean Air Lines Flight 007 flew
off course and was shot down by Soviet fighter planes in 1983, President
Ronald Reagan made GPS technology, in a degraded form, available for
commercial air travel purposes.' By the 199os, civilians more generally
were given access to GPS technology, albeit encumbered by a feature
that introduced substantial errors.' °2 In 2000, President Clinton finally
allowed civilians access to the error-free GPS technology."
If this is to be a model of Phaser regulation, we might predict that
the military will strive at first to keep the principles and the technology
to itself. Sparked by some incident, however, the federal government will
be prodded to afford access for some nonmilitary purposes. The Phaser's
first generation would likely be massive, requiring large energy
expenditures, affixed atop a truck or tank, and intended for battlefield
use. A second generation product would be smaller, perhaps mounted to
a van, and adapted for police in riot control situations. Eventually, a
third generation would be small and light enough for use by soldiers in
battle or police officers on the beat. The price, at first prohibitive, would
eventually render the potential purchase and use by civilians a legitimate
issue. Eventually, civilians would be allowed to purchase and use
Phasers.
A different trajectory is suggested by the story of machine gun
regulation. Machine guns were first widely used by the military in the
twentieth century. Before any robust civilian market arose, the National
Firearms Act of 1934 subjected the sale and ownership of machine guns
to an oppressive licensing and taxation regime," and the Firearms
Owners' Protection Act of 1986 effectively froze the supply of machine
99. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
ioo. See Jonathan M. Epstein, The Role of the Global Positioning System in the Environment, 6
N.Y.U. ENVrL. L.J. 72, 74 (I997).
tot. Id.
102. Press Release, Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy, Improving the Civilian Global Positioning
System (GPS) (May I, 2000), available at http://clinton4.nara.gov/textonly/WHfEOP/OSTP/html/
053_4.html.
103. Id.
104. See ch. 757,48 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872 (2oo6)).
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guns available to civilians. 5 Today, notwithstanding the fact that
machine guns are standard-issue military weapons, there are very few in
the hands of the general public." With respect to Phasers, one can
imagine that Congress, lobbied by the Defense Department, would
institute an onerous licensing and taxation regime for Phaser sales to the
general public, effectively banning their manufacture for civilian use.
State legislatures, lobbied by anti-weapons organizations, would add
another layer of regulation and outright bans. Phasers, however widely
used by the military, would be extraordinarily uncommon in the general
public: in the words of Heller, they would constitute "dangerous and
unusual weapons"' and would not be of a kind "typically possessed by
law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes." ''
V. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO BANS ON NONLETHAL WEAPONS
A. THE LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE
Before considering possible legal challenges to bans on nonlethal
weapons, we take a brief detour to consider the law of self-defense. As
Paul Robinson has noted, Heller did not purport to alter the criminal law
of self-defense.'" That law provides that any use of force in defense of
property or life must be necessary to repel the attack and proportionate
to the threat posed."' Even for police officers, these basic principles
apply, albeit refracted through the lens of the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. As the Supreme
Court ruled in Tennessee v. Garner, police officers are forbidden from
using "excessive force" in any confrontation with a civilian."' There are
already dozens of cases alleging "excessive force" when police officers
have used Tasers,"2 but it is interesting to note a scattering of cases
alleging police misconduct because of the failure to use Tasers."3
105. See Pub. L. No. 99-308, too Stat. 449 (codified as amended in scattered sections of i8 and 26
U.S.C.).
io6. Since 1986, federal law has frozen the number of such weapons that can be legally registered
for civilian use at about 240,000 in a nation of over 300 million people. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(0);
MARIANNE W. ZAwITz, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUNS USED IN CRIME 4 (1995), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/guic.pdf.
107. 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817 (2008) (citations omitted).
io8. Id. at 2816.
to9. Robinson, supra note 8I, at 252.
IIO. Id. at 253.
Ill. 471 U.S. 1, 7-1 5 (1985).
112. See, e.g., Roberts v. Manigold, 240 F. App'x 675, 678 (6th Cir. 2007); Draper v. Reynolds, 369
F.3 d 1270 (IIth Cir. 2004); Parker v. City of South Portland, No. o6-I2 9 -P-S, 2007 WL 1468658 (D.
Me. May 18, 2007); Landis v. Cardoza, 515 F. Supp. 2d 809 (E.D. Mich. 2007); McGee v. City of
Cincinnati Police Dept., No. I:o6-CV-7 26, 2007 WL 1169374, (S.D. Ohio Apr. i8, 2007). See generally
Kedir, supra note 78, at 368-75.
113. See, e.g., Martinez v. County of Los Angeles, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 772, 779 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996);
Day v. County of Contra Costa, No. C 07-4335, 2008 WL 4858472, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. io, 2008)
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There is an unmistakable logic to the latter argument: police, just
like citizens in self-defense situations, may use only that force necessary
to obtain their lawful objectives. Imagine that a person makes a
threatening gesture at a police officer, and moves in the officer's
direction. The police officer is entitled, of course, to use force, but only
enough to repel the attack and make an arrest. If the only weapon the
officer carried was a firearm, it might be lawful to use it; but if the officer
also carried a Taser or pepper spray, the use of the firearm might be
illegal. Or, stepping back, the failure of a locality to equip the officer with
a Taser could give rise to municipal liability. The latter claim would
become more viable as more and more police forces equipped their
officers with Tasers.
Tasers are available to the public, and similar lawsuits might
someday be brought against civilians who use firearms in self-defense. In
public, and even within one's home, a civilian may use only that force
necessary to repel an attack."4 The decision to use more force than
necessary in defense of property and life can give rise to civil and even
criminal liability."5 One may even incur liability with respect to one's
choice of ammunition. For example, a damaging fact in the trial of
Harold Fish, an Arizona man convicted of murder in connection with the
shooting death of a threatening homeless man, was that Fish had used
iomm hollow point rounds."6 Fish's use of this ammunition, which
prosecutors insinuated was peculiarly lethal, contributed, at least
atmospherically, to undercutting Fish's claims that he acted in self-
defense."7 Perhaps in the future, if Super-Tasers or Phasers are widely
available to the public and comparable in cost to handguns, the choice to
use the latter will likewise undercut self-defense claims when civilians use
lethal force.
B. CHALLENGES TO TASER BANS
Before Heller, the District of Columbia banned the ownership by the
general public of Tasers."I This ban was not challenged, and it was
nowhere mentioned in Heller's majority or dissenting opinions. In the
aftermath of the decision, the District of Columbia loosened its statutory
restrictions on handguns, but left unaffected the provision on "dangerous
devices," which run the gamut from poison gas and grenades to Tasers."9
(noting the police officer's failure to carry a Taser).
114. See Ren6e Lettow Lerner, The Worldwide Popular Revolt Against Proportionality in Self-
Defense, 2 J.L. ECON. & POL'y 331, 332-33 (2oo6).
II5. Robinson, supra note 81, at 253.
116. See John Larson, Trail of Evidence, MSNBC.coM, Oct. 9, 2oo6, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
15199221 (noting that the prosecutor said, "Mr. Fish knew well what a hollow-point bullet does.").
117. Id.
118. See D.C. CODE § 7-2501 (2001). The D.C. law also regulated pepper spray purchases. Id.
ii9. D.C. CODE § 7-2501.01(7)(D) (defining a "destructive device" as "[any device designed or
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The District of Columbia is now in the somewhat odd, though not
unprecedented, position of regulating ownership of handguns less
stringently than ownerships of Tasers. As noted earlier, seven states have
outright bans of Tasers,'2 ° and in some states, such as Michigan, carrying
handguns is permitted, while carrying Tasers is outlawed.' In 2008, three
state legislators introduced a bill in the Michigan legislature to permit the
general public to purchase stun guns. 2' If the Michigan bill is not
enacted, would a judicial challenge to its Taser ban, or the Taser ban now
in effect in the District of Columbia, survive post-Heller scrutiny?'
There have already been dozens of federal and state cases
construing Heller, but they provide little guidance in answering this
question.2 4 Many of these cases have involved challenges to laws
criminalizing the ownership of firearms by felons,"5 a prohibition
specifically endorsed by Heller, albeit in dicta."' There have also been
challenges to prohibitions on the ownership of certain kinds of firearms,
and here Justice Scalia provided some guidelines. He stated that the
"arms" protected by the Second Amendment exclude "weapons not
typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as
short-barreled shotguns.'2I The rationale for this exception was based on
a combination of precedent and history:
We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep
and carry arms. Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of
weapons protected were those "in common use at the time." We think
that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of
prohibiting the carrying of "dangerous and unusual weapons."
'' '
redesigned, made or remade, or readily converted or restored, and intended to stun or disable a
person by means of electric shock").
120. See supra note 71.
121. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 750.224a (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2008) (ban on stun
gun ownership), with id. § 28.425 (licensing regime for concealed carrying of firearms).
122. Delores Flynn, Sale of Tasers to Public Weighed, DETROr NEWS, Apr. 8, 20o8 (quoting an Air
National Guardswoman: "I believe firearms are a good thing, but I'm concerned about potential stray
bullets harming someone, especially in my home .... If I shot someone and the bullet went through
them, then through a wall or window and hit an innocent bystander on the sidewalk, that's the
absolute last thing I'd want to happen trying to defend yourself.").
123. For purposes of this Article, we assume that the Supreme Court will make the Second
Amendment applicable to the States through Fourteenth Amendment "incorporation." For
discussions of the reasons for expecting this outcome, see Nelson Lund, Anticipating Second
Amendment Incorporation: The Role of the Inferior Courts, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 185, 196-99 (2oo8);
and Nelson Lund, The Past and Future of the Individual's Right to Arms, 31 GA. L. REV. I, 46-55
(1996).
124. See Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Heller, High Water(mark)? Lower Courts and
the New Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 6o HASTINGS L.J. 1245 (2009).
125. Id. at 1248-52.
126. 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816-17 (2oo8).
127. Id. at 2815-16.
128. Id. at 2817 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)).
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Under Heller, how would a challenge to an outright ban on Tasers
fare? Because the Second Amendment protects at least an individual's
right to self-defense in the home, a blanket ban on Tasers would be
suspect. The fact that Tasers were not available in 1791 would not be
dispositive, and a court could take note of the fact that Tasers, like
handguns, are fairly widely owned by the public today, although not
nearly as widely as handguns. Furthermore, such a ban discriminates
against an attractive class of persons-those seeking to defend
themselves, but saddled with moral misgivings about taking another's
life. Because Heller gave significance to the advantage of handguns over
shotguns and rifles for physically weak people in defending their homes,
it would be easy to read Heller as protecting the right of morally
scrupulous people to defend their lives with a commonplace nonlethal
weapon.2 9
On the other hand, the government could argue that, unlike the
District of Columbia prior to Heller, it is not completely depriving the
public of its right to meaningful self-defense; after all, the public is free to
own handguns. Although the Court in Heller rejected rational basis
review, it failed to specify what level of scrutiny does apply.'30 A Taser
ban might be defended on the grounds that such devices are unreliable
for self-defense in the circumstances most likely to be faced by civilians,
and that they are tempting instruments for illegitimate purposes such as
torture or responding to insults or trivial threats. In addition, the Heller
language specifically exempting "dangerous and unusual weapons" from
constitutional protection would be helpful in defending a Taser ban.
Tasers are less rooted in our historical traditions than firearms, less
commonly owned and used today, and perhaps in some ways more
horrifying than traditional, albeit more lethal, firearms.
Whatever the outcome, suits challenging Taser bans'3 ' would be far
from legally frivolous, and the road to such a challenge might be paved in
this way: stories of alleged Taser misuse, especially by police, re-inspire
regulatory efforts to restrict the public's access to such weapons,'32 which
in turn generates increased publicity and popular demand for Tasers,
129. See generally Volokh, supra note 71 (exploring issues raised by the Free Exercise of Religion
Clause).
130. See 128 S. Ct. at 2817-I8 & n.17.
131. Laws forbidding the concealed carrying of Tasers-even in states, such as Connecticut and
North Carolina, that permit the concealed carrying of firearms-might also be vulnerable on the basis
of similar arguments. See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-38(a), 53-206, 53a-3 (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
269(a) (20o5). Heller, however, approved laws prohibiting the concealed carrying of firearms, which
weakens the case for finding a Second Amendment violation. See 128 S. Ct. at 2809, 2816.
132. For example, a bill was introduced in the Alabama legislature last year to prohibit the sale of




precisely because they are less lethal and for that reason more attractive,
at least to some, than traditional firearms.
On balance, we think it is unlikely that there will be a wave of
lawsuits seeking to vindicate the public's right to Tasers. There is no
shortage of Americans very motivated to own traditional firearms, but
the enthusiasm to own and use Tasers has been muted. This is probably
because those with an interest in arming themselves for self-defense have
concluded that Tasers are insufficiently effective and reliable. But this
may change with developing technology and dramatic improvements in
nonlethal weapons, to which we now turn.
C. CHALLENGES TO SUPER-TASER AND PHASER BANS
As sketched in Part III, we envision dramatic improvements in
nonlethal weapons in the future, achieved either incrementally (Super-
Tasers) or through technological breakthroughs (Phasers). In Part IV, we
suggested that the regulatory environment could run the gamut from
lawfulness in all states with few restrictions (the law for pepper spray and
Mace today), lawfulness in most states (Tasers today), or a complicated
patchwork of state-by-state regulation (the law on concealed carrying of
handguns today), to severe federal restrictions (short-barreled shotguns
and machine guns) or even a federal ban (nuclear weapons).
In assessing challenges to bans or burdens on the ownership of
Super-Tasers and Phasers under Heller, the regulatory environment will
be an important consideration. Heller assumed that weapons fall into two
mutually exclusive categories: those that are commonly used by civilians
for lawful purposes and those that are "dangerous and unusual."'33 If
Super-Tasers or Phasers are legal in almost all states, then the decision
by one city or state to ban the weapons would be open to challenge,
assuming the weapons are widely owned in other states.'34
As the weapons are more heavily regulated, however, the answer
may change. If most states ban the weapons, then challenges to such laws
would be more problematic. As we move all the way to an outright
federal ban, a Second Amendment challenge to bans on Super-Tasers
and Phasers might be dead on arrival, precisely because the weapons are
unusual. By banning Super-Tasers and Phasers outright, Congress might
succeed in ensuring that such weapons are not protected by the Second
Amendment. Thus, consistent with the Second Amendment, at least as
construed in Heller, it would be acceptable for the government to
133. 128 S. Ct. at 2817 ("Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected [by
the Second Amendment] were those 'in common use at the time.' We think that limitation is fairly
supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of 'dangerous and unusual weapons."'
(citation omitted) (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 179)).
134. What made the D.C. handgun ban in Heller so vulnerable was the severity of its imposition on
the right to self-defense, combined with the paucity of such restrictions in other jurisdictions.
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completely deny citizens the right to use the most effective weapons of
self-defense then available-weapons that, one can safely assume, police
officers would be carrying.
This result highlights a difficulty with the "dangerous and unusual
weapons" test. In a circular way, under Heller, government prohibition
on the ownership of Super-Tasers and Phasers would render
constitutional that very prohibition. As one of us has argued elsewhere,
Heller's dictum about dangerous and unusual weapons is devoid of
support in the sources that Justice Scalia cited.' What is worse, it
effectively empowers the government to create its own exceptions to the
Second Amendment right so long as the Supreme Court waits awhile
after the banning of a weapon before it checks to see whether such
weapons are in common civilian use. What is worse yet, it makes it very
easy for the government to take newly developed technologies outside
the scope of the Second Amendment by the simple expedient of banning
or restrictively regulating them before they have a chance to come into
common civilian use. This defeats the purpose of having a right
enumerated in the Constitution in the first place.
The Court, and Justice Scalia, recognized a related and similarly
obvious point in Kyllo, which rejected the argument that Fourth
Amendment rights evaporate when the government adopts novel
technologies to invade the privacy of the home.' The same point should
be recognized in the context of the Second Amendment. Kyllo,
moreover, suggests one way to do it. Just as Kyllo adopted a presumption
that the police may employ surveillance technologies in widespread use by
civilians,'37 so the courts should adopt a presumption that civilians may
employ self-defense technologies in widespread use by the police.""3
This makes logical sense because police officers and civilians are
similarly (though not identically) situated with respect to self-defense.
The most common threats are similar and the limits on the legitimate use
of force are similar as well. If governments arm police officers with
Tasers, as they do, this is a very good indication that these devices are
not so "dangerous and unusual" that the government can have good
reasons to keep them out of civilian hands. The same will be true with
Super-Tasers and Phasers, if and when they are developed and adopted
by the police.
The presumption that civilians have a right to use weapons
commonly used by the police should be rebuttable by sufficiently strong
135. See Lund, supra note 24.
136. 533 U.S. 27, 35-36 (2001).
137. See id. at 34.
138. For a similar suggestion, which focuses on firearms, see the excellent analysis in Michael P.




evidence that a particular device is suitable for police work but not for
civilian use. There might also be a correlative presumption against
Second Amendment protection for weapons that the police are
forbidden to use, although this too should be rebuttable, for example, in
cases where the police are restricted to using expensive weaponry that
many civilians cannot afford.
These simple rules will not resolve every case, but we think they can
provide a useful starting point for analysis, and could help future courts
avoid the kind of unsupported ipse dixits with which the Helter majority
opinion is rife.
CONCLUSION
Changing social conditions, including technological developments,
create perennial challenges for originalism as a method of constitutional
interpretation. The world of the twenty-first century, some have argued,
is so dramatically different from the world of the Founders that the
Constitution and Bill of Rights provide spare guidance to jurists and
policymakers today.'39 In Kyllo and Heller, Justice Scalia began by
seeking the original meaning of the Fourth and Second Amendments,
respectively, and then faced the task of applying that meaning to
contemporary conditions that differed significantly from conditions in
1791. In both cases, Justice Scalia's resolution of the constitutional
question turned largely on whether certain technologies were in
widespread use among the present-day public. In Kyllo, the inquiry made
logical sense in relation to the purpose of Fourth Amendment protection
from unreasonable searches, but in Heller the inquiry made little sense in
relation to the Second Amendment's purpose of protecting the right to
have weapons for self-defense.
Consider this analogy: are images that a legislature considers
offensive protected by the First Amendment? Imagine that a court
begins by determining that the purpose of the First Amendment is to
protect both political and artistic self-expression. On that premise, the
court concludes that hard-core pornography is protected because it is
139. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Judicial Autonomy in a Political Environment, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. i,
7 (2oo6).
[The Constitution, Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment] reflect the culture and the
politics and the moral beliefs of a small pre-industrial and pre-technological nation, a nation
different in every way from what it is today. There is no way, whatever "originalists" or
"textualists" may say, in which you can take the documents of 1787, 1789, and 1868 and lay
them beside some contemporary issue and read off an answer and, if you are criticized as
taking sides in a political controversy, respond by saying, "No, I just looked at what the
Constitution says, and I looked at what the case before me is about. I just read carefully and
came up with an answer to the question presented by the case and anybody who reads
carefully and is trained as a lawyer would come up with the same answer." Constitutional
law is something that the Supreme Court has created, creates, and uncreates continuously.
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wildly popular on the Internet, but that pictures of flag desecration are
unprotected because very few people seem interested in creating or
viewing them. No such analysis would be taken seriously in a First
Amendment case. That, however, is essentially the Heller opinion.
Handguns are protected by the Second Amendment because they are
widely popular with the public notwithstanding their obvious
dangerousness, but short-barreled shotguns are unprotected because
they are "dangerous and unusual."
What is popular with the public is heavily affected by what Congress
and the state legislatures have decided to permit and prohibit, and short-
barreled shotguns have been virtually prohibited for the past several
decades. Turn now to nonlethal weapons. If federal regulators had
preserved their original bans on Tasers, civilians would never have come
to own them in the numbers they do today, and Tasers almost certainly
would flunk the Second Amendment test created by the Heller Court.
Likewise, future nonlethal weapons, if they are banned at the outset,
could be said to be "dangerous and unusual," at least among civilians,
and therefore without any constitutional protection. Here we may be
talking about weapons that are superior to modem firearms as weapons
of self-defense because they are easier to use, more reliable in disabling
aggressors, and less risky to human life.
In anticipating these developments, this Article has highlighted a
crucial defect in the Heller opinion and also suggested a more sensible
approach in applying the Second Amendment to emerging technologies.
Under this approach, which is suggested by Kyllo, current and future
nonlethal weapons should presumptively be available for civilian use if
governments regularly arm police officers with similar devices. Because it
is a presumption, it is only a starting place for analysis, but it is a starting
place that is logically consistent with the purpose of the Second
Amendment identified in Heller, and it avoids allowing the government
to curtail an important constitutional right through a kind of preemptive
fiat.
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